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Abstract
This paper asks whether tax cycles can represent the optimal policy in a model
without any extrinsic uncertainty.
I show, in an economy without capital and where labor is the only choice
variable (a Lucas-Stokey economy), that a large class of preferences exists,
where cycles are optimal, as well as a large class where they are not.
The larger government expenditures are, the larger the class of preferences for
which cycles are optimal becomes.
Tax cycles are also more likely to be optimal if frictions (deviations of the
model from Walrasian markets) are added. While this cannot be shown in
general and will not be true for arbitrary frictions, I demonstrate this in
two specific worlds. I consider an economy with search frictions in the labor
market, and one with frictions in the goods and credit market. A reasonable
parametrization of both economies shows that results change considerably.
Even with constant relative risk aversion, cycles can be optimal, whereas this
class of preferences rules out cycles in the Lucas-Stokey economy.
Finally, I characterize the optimal policy. No more than two tax rates are
needed to implement the Ramsey policy both in the Lucas-Stokey economy
and in the model with frictions.
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1 Introduction
This paper asks whether tax cycles represent the optimal Ramsey tax policy in the
simplest framework possible (Lucas and Stokey (1983), LS hereafter). There is no
uncertainty, no capital or money, and households’ only endogenous choices are how
much labor to supply and how many bonds to buy. The government issues bonds
and taxes labor income to maximize welfare, and can commit to future policies.
The question is then: is it optimal, in a model without any extrinsic uncertainty, to
smooth taxes as suggested by Barro (1979), or are tax cycles welfare-improving?
The explanation why cycles could represent the optimal choice is simple. Math-
ematically, the reason is the potential non-convexity of the Ramsey optimization
problem. First-order conditions are then not sufficient to characterize the optimum:
the first-order approach is invalid. The Ramsey planner takes into account the fact
that a change in tax rates changes the price of consumption and thus interest rates.
A cycle is optimal whenever this change in interest rates relaxes the government’s
budget sufficiently to compensate for the welfare loss from the induced variation
in consumption, hours and wages. In particular, cycles are fully policy-induced and
would not exist without policy.1
I show that in the LS economy, two classes of preferences exist, with different
implications. One class implies that tax smoothing is optimal, whereas within the
other class, tax cycles improve welfare. With separability between consumption and
leisure, these two classes can be fully and sharply characterized.
(Weakly) Increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA) in consumption2 implies the
optimality of tax smoothing, whereas sufficiently strong decreasing relative risk aver-
1Although the question here is whether it is optimal for the Ramsey planner to implement
cycles in an acyclical economy, cycles can be the market outcome in other (multi-sector growth)
models (McKenzie (1986), Boldrin and Montrucchio (1995)).
2What matters here is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, although the preferences
(DRRA, CRRA, IRRA) are classified according to their risk aversion.
sion (DRRA), empirically the more relevant case3, implies the optimality of a cycle.
For non-separable preferences, if consumption and leisure are substitutes, the
Ramsey policy is characterized by cycles for a larger set of parameter values.
I then derive a simple criterion in subsection 3.2 to check whether a two-period
cycle is welfare-improving in the LS economy. This criterion is silent on the shape
of the optimal policy. Subsection 3.5 partially fills this gap. An optimal policy (after
the initial period) can be implemented by no more than two different tax rates. The
optimal policy is either constant or discontinuous. In particular, the optimal policy
is not necessarily differentiable as Chamley (1986) assumes in order to verify that
cycles are not optimal.
A natural question that then arises is whether IRRA always, in models other
than that of LS, rules out cycles as part of the optimal policy. To show that the
results apply in models that are more policy-relevant than LS, I show that they also
apply in a model with labor market frictions (as in Pissarides (1985, 2000)), and
again in Lagos and Wright (2005), a model with frictions in the goods and credit
market. The advantage of choosing these models is that they are close to an LS
economy in many respects, permitting analytical results to be derived, which are
useful for interpreting my own findings. At the same time, exactly the same fric-
tions which characterize these simple models are also present in much richer models
used for policy analysis, so that the possibility of tax cycles being optimal cannot
be ruled out a priori for these models either.
Labor market frictions are modeled, following Pissarides (1985, 2000), as search
frictions in a search and matching model. The difference from LS is that the only
(interesting) decision in LS is how many hours to work, whereas the decision in a
search economy is how many vacancies to post. The theoretical results derived for
LS are thus applicable. The simple economy differs from Pissarides (1985, 2000) in
3Vissing-Jorgenson (2002) provides evidence that richer households have a higher elasticity of
intertemporal substitution than poorer ones. For this type of preferences, this implies that risk
aversion decreases with wealth. See Gollier (2001) for a further discussion of DRRA and references
to the literature.
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terms of bargaining and in the explicit consideration of intertemporal substitution.
When the model is calibrated in a standard way, I find that cycles become optimal
for constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
To model product market frictions, I consider the Lagos and Wright (2005)
model, which provides a tractable way to deal with two separate frictions. The
terms of trade of some transactions are determined through bargaining, and credit
cannot be used to pay for these goods. In a parameterized example I find that cycles
can improve welfare for all CRRA preferences.
Thus the belief that restricting oneself to IRRA or even CRRA could rule out
cycles and potentially validate the first-order approach is not warranted. Cycles can
improve welfare even in a simple model, one not too different from the LS world.
Cycles are optimal for two reasons. First, frictions imply that the economy is inef-
ficient (the first welfare theorem does not hold even without a government). If this
inefficiency is strong enough, cycles can represent the optimal policy, a result that
is already true in the LS economy.4 Second, prices or wages are not formed in a
perfectly competitive market; that is, marginal rates of transformation do not equal
marginal rates of substitution. This deviation from LS can make prices and wages
and thus tax revenue a more convex function of the allocation.5
My paper is related to Hassler, Krusell, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2004)
(HKSZ), who show that without geometric depreciation of capital, optimal capi-
tal income tax rates oscillate. However, their paper differs from mine in that they
are not only silent on the properties of labor taxes, but also provide a quite different
reason for oscillations (moreover, in HKSZ oscillations generically die out).6 The
4In an LS economy, cycles can become the optimal policy if the allocation is sufficiently inefficient
(because of higher government expenditures and thus higher taxes).
5A more sophisticated search economy is considered by Shimer and Smith (2001), who show
that the optimal matching policy can be non stationary. However, the reason for non stationarity
is quite different. Ex ante heterogeneity of workers in their model leads to a matching externality
which is absent from my model.
6As a special case, if capital does not depreciate in the first period and fully depreciates in the
second period, oscillations do not die out. In all other cases, the tax rate converges to a constant
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timing of taxes is an optimal response to the different depreciation rates of old and
new capital, since it allows the inelastically supplied capital stock in period 0 to be
partially confiscated (although tax rates are zero in period 0).7
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 considers the optimal policy and its characteristics in the basic
Lucas-Stokey economy. Section 4 analyzes a search and matching model of the labor
market, while Section 5 investigates the Lagos and Wright (2005) model. Section 6
concludes by summarizing the results. All proofs are delegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
In this section I describe the Lucas and Stokey (1983) economy without uncertainty.
All prices are determined in competitive Walrasian markets, and households decide
how many hours to work, how much to consume and how many bonds to buy. The
government finances an exogenous stream of expenditures by levying distortionary
labor income taxes and issuing bonds.
2.1 Private Sector
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households. Each house-
hold’s preferences over a stream of consumption and leisure are described by a utility
function
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, ht) (1)
level, whereby oscillations die out.
7Kocherlakota (2006) criticizes the arbitrary restriction of tax instruments in the Ramsey ap-
proach and argues that the only constraints in a taxation problem should be informational and/or
enforcement frictions. This critique applies here as well. But, interestingly, it has been demon-
strated in this literature as well that the first-order approach is not valid (Kocherlakota (2004) and
Coles (2006)).
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where ct denotes consumption, ht denotes labor and β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the subjective
discount factor. The single-period utility function u is assumed to be strictly increas-
ing in ct and strictly decreasing in ht, strictly concave and three times continuously
differentiable. uc(t) and uh(t) denote the derivative of period t utility with respect
to c and h respectively. There is no uncertainty. In each period t ≥ 0, households
can buy one-period government bonds Bt+1, which pay out Bt+1 consumption goods
in period t + 1. The product market is perfectly competitive, and the production
function is assumed to be a linear function of labor ht, F (ht) = ht. Firms take the
real wage wt, which equals 1 in equilibrium, as given. They hire labor ht to maximize
profits. Households are paid a net wage rate wt · (1 − τt), where τt is the labor tax
rate at period t.
The household’s flow budget constraint in period t ≥ 1 is given by:
ct +Bt+1/Rt+1 ≤ Bt + (1− τt)wtht, (2)
where 1/Rt+1 denotes the period-t price of a claim to one unit of consumption in
period t+1. The left-hand side of the budget constraint represents the uses of wealth:
consumption spending and bond purchases. The right-hand side shows the sources
of wealth: bonds acquired in the previous period, plus labor income.
The household starts with initial wealth B0 and is subject to the following borrowing
constraint that prevents it from engaging in Ponzi schemes:
lim
t→∞
qtBt ≥ 0, (3)
where qt :=
∏t
i=1
1
Ri
is the period-zero price of one unit of consumption to be deliv-
ered in period t. q0 is normalized to one.
The household chooses {ct, ht, Bt+1}∞t=0 to maximize (1), subject to (2) and (3),
taking as given {wt, Rt+1, τt}∞t=0 and initial wealth B0.
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2.2 Government
The government faces a stream of unproductive public consumption gt = g. This is
financed by levying labor income taxes at a rate τt and by issuing one-period bonds.
The government’s sequential budget constraint is given by
Bt+1/Rt+1 = Bt + gt − τtwtht. (4)
2.3 Equilibrium
Definition 1. Given an initial condition B0, a competitive equilibrium is a sequence
{ct, gt = g, ht, τt, wt, Bt+1, Rt+1}∞t=0 such that:
i) The government budget constraint is satisfied for all t ≥ 0.
ii) The household’s choice problem is solved.
iii) The goods market clears: ct + g = ht.
iv) Firms maximize profits.
A competitive equilibrium {ct, gt = g, ht, τt, wt, Bt+1, Rt+1}∞t=0 then satisfies the fol-
lowing conditions:
ct + g = ht (5)
−uh(ct, ht)
uc(ct, ht)
= wt(1− τt) = (1− τt) (6)
ct +Bt+1/Rt+1 = Bt + (1− τt)ht (7)
uc(ct, ht) = βRt+1uc(ct+1, ht+1) (8)
lim
t→∞
qtBt = 0, (9)
where (5) is the resource constraint, (6) describes an equilibrium in the labor market,
(7) is the household’s budget constraint, (8) is the consumption Euler equation, and
(9) is the no-Ponzi condition.
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3 Optimal Dynamic Policy
In this section I consider whether implementing a constant tax rate is an optimal
strategy for the government. I derive a condition to check whether a cycle is superior,
and prove the properties of such a non-deterministic policy.
3.1 The Ramsey problem
The Ramsey problem is the choice of an implementable allocation which maximizes
welfare. The next two definitions state this more precisely.
Definition 2. An allocation {ct, ht}∞t=0 is implementable if {τt, wt, Bt+1, Rt+1}∞t=0
exists, such that {ct, gt = g, ht, τt, wt, Bt+1, Rt+1}∞t=0 is a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 3. A Ramsey solution is an allocation that maximizes welfare over all
implementable allocations.
I now reproduce the well-known primal-form representation as described in Lu-
cas and Stokey (1983). The basic idea is to use first-order conditions to eliminate
all prices and taxes from the equilibrium conditions. Only the two variables con-
sumption and hours appear in the resulting primal form. This method allows all
implementable allocations to be characterized by only two equations. The first of
these is the resource constraint (5). To derive the second equation, I start with the
intertemporal budget constraint of the representative household:
∞∑
t=0
qt(ct − (1− τt)ht) = B0.
Since the individual’s consumption Euler equation implies that
qt = β
t uc(ct, ht)
uc(c0, h0)
,
and as the intratemporal condition implies
−uh(ct, ht)
uc(ct, ht)
= 1− τt,
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I can substitute for qt and τt. The budget constraint can then be written as
∞∑
t=0
βt
uc(ct, ht)
uc(c0, h0)
[
ct +
uh(ct, ht)
uc(ct, ht)
ht
]
= B0,
which is equivalent to the implementability constraint
uc(0)B0 =
∑
t≥0
βt(uc(t) · ct + uh(t) · ht).
The following proposition presents the primal-form characterization for this econ-
omy, which says that the implementability constraint and the resource constraint
are necessary and sufficient for implementability.
Proposition 1. For any B0, an allocation {ct, ht}∞t=0 is implementable if and only
if
uc(0)B0 =
∑
t≥0
βt(uc(t) · ct + uh(t) · ht) (10)
ct + g = ht. (11)
Proof: See Lucas and Stokey (1983) or Chari and Kehoe (1999).
The Ramsey problem can be stated as choosing consumption ct and labor ht to
maximize (1), subject to equations (10) and (11).8 I restrict myself to B0 = 0 in
what follows since this makes period t = 0 look like all other periods (t > 0). All
theoretical results hold without this assumption, and the quantitative implications
will be discussed later.
3.2 A Criterion for Optimal Cycles
The Ramsey problem is stationary, and a reasonable guess is that a time-invariant
allocation is optimal.
8An upper-bound on hours ensures that the objective function is bounded, and I proceed under
the assumption that g is not too large, so that the set of feasible policies is not empty. The same
mathematical theorems (for example Tychonoff’s theorem) as applied in Aiyagari (1994) then
imply existence.
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Definition 4. A time invariant allocation (c, h) is an implementable sequence {ct =
c, ht = h}∞t=0.
An optimal time invariant allocation (hTI , cTI) achieves the highest welfare among
all time invariant policies.
Optimality in the definition is conditional on being time-invariant (TI). The logic
of the Laffer curve implies that there are multiple TI allocations.9 The optimal TI
allocation picks the solution with the highest welfare. hTI then (not uniquely) solves
g = h · (1 + uh(h− g, h)/uc(h− g, h)), and cTI equals hTI − g.
This section’s theorem will show when a TI allocation and thus a TI policy is not the
solution to the Ramsey problem. Labor supply and consumption are not constant
in this case.
What does a simple time-varying policy look like? The main features of such a
policy can be conveyed in a two-period model. In the first period, labor taxes are
lowered and thus tax revenue decreases, so that debt has to be issued to pay for
government expenditure. In the second period, the labor tax rate is increased to
repay the debt (plus interest payments). The size of the necessary tax increase in
the second period depends on the level of the real interest rate. To understand how
this policy affects the interest rate, note that the labor supply and thus consump-
tion increase in the first period and decrease in the second. The consumption Euler
equation then implies that the interest rate decreases.
This reasoning suggests that two numbers are crucial if cycles are to be optimal.
The first of these number is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which deter-
mines how much interest rates drop in response to the tax changes described in the
previous paragraph. The second number is the wage elasticity of hours worked. This
determines how much labor supply decreases (increases) and tax revenues increases
(decreases) if the tax rate is increased (decreased).
To assess the (non)optimality of a TI allocation, two concepts have to be intro-
9This multiplicity does not imply the existence of a cycle.
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duced. Let
CS(ht) = uc(ht − g, ht) · (ht − g) + uh(ht − g, ht) · ht
be the current value of period t surplus10 and
CU(ht) = u(ht − g, ht)
be the current value of period t utility.
The convexity of CS(·) is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a TI policy
not to be optimal, since otherwise first-order conditions would be sufficient to char-
acterize the Ramsey solution. With convexity of CS, there can be more than one
solution to the first-order conditions.
A cyclical policy increases welfare only if the average labor supply increases over
the cycle. The increase in welfare is greater the higher CU′ is at the TI solution
hTI .11 And CU ′ is higher the further hTI is away from the efficient solution. But
utility is concave, and thus households prefer a constant consumption level to a
cyclical consumption level if both choices have the same average value. This aver-
sion to cycles increases the higher CU′′ is.
To implement a higher labor supply level, taxes have to be lowered. Since average
labor supply increases, labor taxes therefore have to decrease on average. The size
of this decrease depends on CS′. The convexity of CS has to ensure that the present
value budget is nevertheless balanced. The higher CS′′ is, the greater is the increase
in the government’s tax revenues.
To summarize, a tax cycle is optimal if four conditions are met: the time-invariant
policy is sufficiently inefficient (CU ′ high); the utility function is not too concave
(−CU ′′ low) so that the aversion to cycles is not that large; the labor supply is
sufficiently responsive to tax changes (−CS ′ low); and tax revenues are sufficiently
convex (CS ′′ high). Since these four variables (CU ′, CU ′′, CS ′, CS ′′) all depend on
10Note that CS is indeed the government’s primary surplus since (6) implies that CS(h) =
uc(h− g, h)(h− g − (1− τ)h) = uc(h− g, h)(τh− g).
11f ′(f ′′) denotes the first (second) derivative of a one-dimensional function f .
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the utility function, they cannot be changed independently from each other. For ex-
ample, for a utility function of the form c
1−σ
1−σ −χ(h), a lower elasticity of substitution
1
σ
increases both −CU ′′ and CS ′′. However, two variables, CS ′′ and CU ′, turn out
to be key. CS ′′ has to be positive to render the problem non-convex. In addition, the
economy has to be sufficiently inefficient (CU ′ high), either due to high government
expenditures or due to other “frictions”, as for example in Sections 4 and 5.
The following theorem presents a condition which indicates when a cycle is
welfare-improving. This criterion summarizes the previous arguments and is ana-
lyzed in the remainder of this subsection.
Theorem 1. Let (hTI , cTI) be the optimal TI allocation.
CS ′′
CU ′′
(hTI)− CS
′
CU ′
(hTI) < 0 (∗)
implies that the optimal TI policy is not the solution to the Ramsey problem. A
welfare-improving two-period cycle exists.
Derivatives are taken with respect to h. The criterion in the theorem is equivalent
to a second-order condition of the constrained maximization problem. The proof
uses a perturbation argument to show that a two-period cycle is welfare-improving.
Condition (∗) can easily be rewritten in terms of primitives. CU ′, CU ′′, CS ′, CS ′′
depend on the utility function and hTI is a solution to a first-order condition that
purely depends on primitives.
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the possibility of a cycle in a two-period model.
Labor supply in the first period h1 is on the x-axis, and labor supply in the second
period h2 is on the y-axis. The efficient level of labor supply is h
∗, and hTI is the TI
policy. The solid line is the indifference curve of the representative household through
the point (hTI , hTI). Allocations with higher labor supply h generate higher utility
as long as h is smaller than h∗. The graph also shows curves in the (h1, h2) space
which generate the same tax revenue as (hTI , hTI). There are three possibilities for
the shape of this curve. In case (I) the curve is concave. In case (II) the curve
is convex but “less convex” than the indifference curve. In case (III) the curve is
11
Figure 1: Optimal taxation with two periods
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convex and “more convex” than the indifference curve at (hTI , hTI). Eventually the
tax curve has to intersect the indifference curve when h becomes too small and the
indifference curve is again more convex. But what matters for condition (∗) is the
curvature at hTI .
In the first two cases a TI policy is optimal. There is no combination of h1 and
h2 that generates the same tax revenue as (h
TI , hTI) and higher utility. In case
(III), such a combination exists, as indicated by the arrow. A two-period cycle
then improves welfare. This is true whenever the tax curve is more convex than
the indifference curve. Mathematically both curves describe h2 as a function of h1.
The elasticity of this function equals −CU
′′hTI
CU ′
(1+1/β)
β
for the indifference curve and
−CS′′hTI
CS′
(1+1/β)
β
for the tax curve. The graphical condition - namely that the tax curve
is more convex than the indifference curve - can be expressed as −CS
′′hTI
CS′ >
−CU ′′hTI
CU ′
and is thus equivalent to condition (∗).
A welfare-improving allocation is located above the indifference curve but below
the tax curve. However, condition (∗) is only a local test since it compares the
elasticities of CU and CS around hTI . In particular, condition (∗) does not hold
globally, so that a corner solution does not improve welfare.
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3.3 Time-invariant Ramsey Policy
There is a class of utility functions such that the optimal TI policy is the Ramsey
policy. To my knowledge this result is new. It is not trivial since the implementability
constraint need not be convex (for example as in Case (II) in Figure 1). Furthermore,
a result that non-steady-state capital income tax rates are zero (Chari and Kehoe
(1999)) does not automatically imply that labor tax rates are constant. The well-
known results by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), namely that steady-state capital
income tax rates are zero, does not rule out cycles either. In case the optimality
criterion implies that a (discontinuous) cycle should be implemented, a constant
allocation is suboptimal. Thus a restriction to steady states is restrictive and cannot
be detected through computing dynamics (eigenvalues) around this steady state
because of the discontinuity.
Theorem 2. Let u(ct, ht) = w(ct)− χ(ht) where
- w exhibits (weakly) increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA) and
- χh(ht) · ht is a convex function of ht.
Then the optimal TI policy is the Ramsey policy.
This theorem applies to classes of preferences considered by the literature (e.g. Lucas
and Stokey (1983) and Chari and Kehoe (1999)). The next two examples provide
several functional forms for w and χ which satisfy the assumptions of theorem 2.
Example (Functional forms for w in theorem 2).
i) w(ct) = (c
(1−σ)
t − 1)/(1− σ) (CRRA)
ii) w(ct) = −exp(−σ · ct) (CARA),
iii) Quadratic w.
The problem is not necessarily convex if χh(ht) · ht is not convex. Although this
assumption does not follow from standard assumptions on primitives, examples of
functional forms for χ are easily found.
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Example (Functional forms for χ in theorem 2).
i) χ(ht) = α · ht, for some α > 0.
ii) χ(ht) = h
α
t , for some α > 1.
iii) χ(ht) = −(T − h)1−θ/(1− θ), for some θ > 0 and a time endowment T .
3.4 Time-varying Ramsey Policy
The last section showed that for separable preferences which exhibit IRRA, time
variation is not optimal. However, this conclusion does not necessarily hold true
for the presumably relevant case of DRRA.12 The next theorem shows that, for the
Hansen (1985) preferences, sufficiently strong DRRA leads to the non-optimality of
a TI policy. For u(ct, ht) = w(ct)−A · ht let κc = w′′′·cw′′ , ηc = w
′′·c
w′ and τ
TI be the tax
rate in the optimal TI policy. Set κ and η to zero if the denominator equals zero.
Theorem 3. Let u(ct, ht) = w(ct) − A · ht and κc, ηc and τTI be as defined before.
Then
1 + κc < ηc/τ
TI (∗∗) (12)
implies that the optimal TI policy is not the solution to the Ramsey problem. A
welfare-improving two-period cycle exists.
DRRA is equivalent to 1 + κc ≤ ηc. The criterion says that DRRA has to be
sufficiently strong. How strong depends on the size of τTI . If τTI approaches 1, a
cycle would be optimal for all DRRA preferences, whereas τTI = 0 implies efficiency
and no cycle at all. A cycle is welfare-enhancing if a variation in consumption leads to
a variation in prices that is high enough to compensate for the household’s aversion
12See for example Gollier (2001) and Vissing-Jorgenson (2002), who argue that decreasing relative
risk aversion seems to be the empirically relevant case. Note that, for the preferences considered
here, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion.
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to this variation in consumption over time. Since the period t price of consumption
equals w′, the size of the price variation is high if w′′′ is high. This is exactly what
DRRA achieves.
The previous theorem only considers linear disutility of labor. The condition
provided there is a special case of the criterion in the next theorem, which makes
no assumptions regarding the functional form of the disutility of labor. It still states
that sufficiently strong DRRA leads to cycles. How strong now also depends on
the curvature of the disutility of labor. As a result, the condition becomes more
complicated than condition (∗∗), which purely focused on the role of DRRA. For
u(ct, ht) = w(ct)−χ(ht), let τTI be the tax rate in the optimal TI policy and define
κc =
w′′′·c
w′′ , ηc =
w′′·c
w′ , κh =
χ′′′·h
χ′′ and ηh =
χ′′·h
χ′ if the denominator is not zero. If the
denominator equals zero, set κ or η to zero.
Theorem 4. Let u(ct, ht) = w(ct)−χ(ht) and and κc, ηc, κh, ηh and τTI be as defined
before. Then
1 +
κcηc − κhηh(1− τTI)2
ηc − ηh(1− τTI)2 +
ηh(1− τTI)− ηc
τTI
< 0 (∗ ∗ ∗) (13)
implies that the optimal TI policy is not the solution to the Ramsey problem. A
welfare improving two-period cycle exists.
Note that utility functions that meet the assumptions of theorem 2 (and thus
imply that a TI policy is optimal) do not satisfy the criterion in theorem 4. The
condition that χh(ht) · ht is convex is equivalent to κh ≥ −2. The next proposition
establishes this claim and confirms the intuition that linear utility makes cycles more
attractive, as long as κh ≥ −2 or, equivalently, as long as χh(ht) · ht is convex.
Proposition 2. Under the assumptions of theorem 4, it holds that:
- If κh ≥ −2 and 1 + κc− ηc ≥ 0 (IRRA), then condition (∗ ∗ ∗) is not satisfied.
- If κh ≥ −2 and if condition (∗ ∗ ∗) holds, then condition (∗∗) holds.
The second part of the theorem states that, if the criterion in theorem 4 indicates
that a cycle improves welfare, then a cycle also improves welfare if disutility is linear
(for the same tax rate τTI and the same κc and ηc).
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Abandoning the assumption of separability between labor and consumption in
the utility function can also render a TI policy nonoptimal. This is for example the
case when u(c, h) = (c · (3− h)2)(1−σ)/(1− σ). For this specification of u, cycles are
more attractive for a less efficient allocation (due to a higher g), as predicted by
criterion (∗). But for realistic values of government expenditures g, cycles require
values of σ > 10, which is within the range provided by Hall (1988), but higher than
the values usually used in calibration exercises.
3.5 Properties of the Ramsey Policy
Theorem 1 shows the nonoptimality of a TI policy through the existence of an
improving cycle of length two. It is silent about the optimality of this cycle. The
following theorem partially fills this gap. It states that the optimal policy implements
only two different tax and labor supply levels.
Theorem 5. The welfare of the optimal Ramsey solution can be arbitrarily well
approximated by a policy that implements only two different levels of h if β > 1/2.13
The idea of the proof is to allow for a specific kind of randomization to convexify
the problem and turn it into a linear programming problem. A well-known result
in linear programming shows that the support of the optimal (randomizing) policy
is not larger than two. It then remains to be shown that the optimal probability
distribution of labor supply levels can be implemented by a sequence of tax rates. It is
this last step where, because of the specific choice of randomization, the assumption
β > 1/2 becomes relevant. An approximation is needed to rule out an infinite number
of different tax rates.
So far I have characterized two classes of preferences, one for which time in-
variance is optimal, and one for which it is not. A possible response could be to
13Arbitrary approximation means that the difference between the welfare level (and the alloca-
tions) of the optimal Ramsey policy and the welfare level of a policy with two tax rates can be
made smaller than any  > 0.
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restrict oneself to the class of preferences where first-order conditions are sufficient,
and ignore the problem from then on. This may be a reasonable approach if the
model being studied is the LS economy, yet this is very often not the case. Various
frictions are built into models in monetary economics (see for example Woodford
(2003) and Lagos and Wright (2005)) and many labor market models incorporate
search frictions (Pissarides (2000)). As the next two sections show, the hope that
results from the LS economy carry over to these more elaborated models, which are
characterized by several frictions, is not warranted.
I consider two specific economies to stress the role of frictions. I first choose a
simple version of a (labor) search and matching economy, in order to approximate
the LS economy as close as possible. In both models there is only one interesting mar-
ket, the labor market, either competitive or characterized through search frictions.
Except for this difference in modeling the labor market, the models are identical.
In particular, there is only one relevant decision variable every period: either the
number of hours worked or the number of vacancies posted. This makes theorems 1
and 5 applicable for the search and matching economy and more generally makes a
comparison with previous results possible.
I then consider optimal cycles in the Lagos and Wright (2005) model. I choose
this model since it provides an analytically tractable framework to deal with fric-
tions in the product and credit market rather than frictions in the labor market. The
terms of trade of some goods are determined through bargaining, and credit cannot
be used to pay for them. Again this economy is simple enough to make theorems 1
and 5 applicable. In addition, the fact that LS arises as a limiting case of Lagos and
Wright (2005) (when frictions vanish) allows me to answer the question how the size
of frictions affects the likelihood of an optimal tax cycle.
For both types of frictions - in the labor and in the goods market - I find that a
reasonable parametrization leads to the conclusion that cycles improve welfare. This
suggests that tax cycles are optimal in a large class of models with labor or product
market frictions.
17
4 A Search and Matching Economy
In this section I consider a search and matching model with the following features.
The equilibrium is inefficient even without government expenditures. As in the LS
world, it is an infinite replication of a one-shot economy. Aggregate hours change
only because individuals leave and enter employment (as in Hansen (1985) and
Rogerson (1988)).
In the chosen environment, there is a continuum of infinitely lived workers and
a continuum of infinitely lived firms, each of measure one. At the beginning of
each period they are, for the sake of simplicity, all unmatched. This eliminates
unemployment as a state variable and makes the economy a replication of one-
shot economies. The production function remains unchanged, and workers derive
utility u(ct) from consuming ct at time t. The discount factor is still denoted by β.
Workers can be matched or unmatched. If matched they produce one unit of output,
are paid a wage wt and receive a net wage wt · (1 − τt). Matched and unmatched
households have the same level of consumption every period. There is a market
that insures households against the possibility of not meeting an employer. Each
household which meets a firm pays a transfer to those which do not meet a firm
such that the consumption level is equalized. Unmatched workers do not produce
and purely consume the transfer from this insurance.
Firms make profit 1−wt per worker and post vacancies at a cost of k. Free entry
implies that the expected value of an open vacancy is zero.
The number of matches at t is given by a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
matching function m(1, vt) = χ·1αv(1−α)t = χ·v(1−α)t . Employment Et equals m(1, vt).
The probability that a worker will be matched in period t equals Et = m(1, vt), and
the probability that a vacancy will be filled equals m(1, vt)/vt = χ · v−αt . I assume
that m(1, v) = χ · v1−αt ≤ min(v, 1). Wages are formed through bargaining in an
alternating offers game as in Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986). Hall and
Milgrom (2006) show that this bargaining game results in a wage 1
2
(1 + b
1−τt ), where
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b is the worker’s utility from perpetual disagreement.14 The after-tax wage It then
equals 1
2
(1−τt+b) and, because of income pooling, each household’s after-tax income
equals ItEt.
The government’s policy options and the household budget constraint remain un-
changed.
Definition 5. An equilibrium is an initial condition B0 and a sequence {ct, gt =
g, vt, Et, τt, Bt+1, Rt+1, It, wt}∞t=0, such that:
i) The government budget constraint is satisfied:
Bt+1/Rt+1 = Bt + gt − τt It(1−τt)Et.
ii) The resource constraint holds: ct + g + kvt = Et.
iii) The household budget constraint is satisfied:
ct +Bt+1/Rt+1 = Bt + ItEt.
iv) Employment equals the number of matched workers: Et = m(1, vt).
v) Wages are formed through bargaining.
vi) Pooling of after-tax labor income: It =
1
2
(1− τt) + 12b.
vii) Free entry: k = m(1,vt)
vt
1
2
(1− b
1−τt ).
viii) Household’s asset choice is optimal.
This leads to the consumption Euler equation: uc(ct) = βRt+1uc(ct+1).
ix) No-Ponzi condition: limt→∞ qtBt = 0.
I now turn to the characterization of the set of implementable allocations.
14Since agreement is immediate in the unique equilibrium of the bargaining game, b only de-
scribes the utility derived out of equilibrium. See Hall and Milgrom (2006) for more details and an
interpretation of b.
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Definition 6. For any B0, an allocation {ct, vt}∞t=0 is imple-
mentable if {τt, wt, It, Bt+1, Rt+1, Et}∞t=0 exists, such that {ct, gt =
g, vt, Et, τt, Bt+1, Rt+1, It, wt}∞t=0 is an equilibrium.
Proposition 3. For any B0, an allocation {ct, vt}∞t=0 is implementable if and only
if
uc(0)B0 =
∑
t≥0
βtuc(t)[ct − { b
2
m(1, vt)/vt − k
1
2
m(1, vt)/vt − k}m(1, vt)]
ct + g + kvt = m(1, vt).
For this model, I can state a result identical to theorem 1, with CS and CU defined
as
CS(vt) = uc(t)[m(1, vt)− g − kvt − { b
2
m(1, vt)/vt − k
1
2
m(1, vt)/vt − k}m(1, vt)]
CU(vt) = u(m(1, vt)− g − kvt).
Again, I need the concept of time invariance (Definition 4). Here vTI denotes the
optimal TI policy, i.e. the constant level of vacancies that is implementable and gives
the highest welfare (conditional on being time-invariant). Since further analytical
results are not available, I now calibrate the model to check whether condition (∗),
CS ′′
CU ′′
(vTI)− CS
′
CU ′
(vTI) < 0,
holds. If it does, then the TI-policy vTI is not the Ramsey policy, and a cycle im-
proves welfare.
Government expenditures and government debt B0 are set equal to zero.
15 The
time period is a quarter, thus β = 0.99. Four parameters remain to be determined:
α, χ, k and b.
For α, the parameter of the matching function, Shimer (2005) estimates (con-
sistent with the model) a value of 0.72, using data on the probability of finding a
job and on labor market tightness. Other studies (see the survey by Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001)) report lower values between 0.3 and 0.7. Measurement error and
15A positive level for B0 is equivalent to assuming a higher level of government expenditures.
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neglecting on-the-job searches seem to render the estimates imprecise. I therefore
report results for a range of values for α.
The exact number of vacancies is irrelevant for any result (see Shimer (2005)),
as long as it is higher than the number of matches. I thus normalize v = 1 (a differ-
ent value for v only results in different values for χ and k). χ then equals E · vα−1
and k = 1
2
· (1− b) · E/v. To determine employment E, Shimer (2005) reports that
the monthly unemployment rate averaged 5.67 percent between 1951 and 2003. The
efficient solution would of course be no unemployment at all. An economy with an
employment rate of 94.33% (1- unemployment rate) is thus quite efficient.16
Finally, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) find that profits that do exceed 2.2% of
revenue are enough to reimburse firms for their vacancy-posting costs.17 I also tried
other values between 1.5% and 3%. The results are insensitive to these variations.
In the model, profits equal 1
2
(1− b/(1− τ)), which pins down b.
The utility function is assumed to be
u(c) = c1−σ/(1− σ).
In section 3.3 it was shown that this choice implies no cycles in the LS economy. This
result now considerably changes. Table 1 reports, for every value of α, the smallest
value for σ, such that a TI policy is not optimal.
Table 1: Parameters for cycles
α 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.7
σ 1.477 1.602 1.750 1.926 2.141 2.409 2.751 3.829
A low level of inefficiency18 and wages not formed in competitive markets lead to a
16Note that interpreting 1−E as nonemployment plus unemployment would render the economy
substantially more inefficient and make cycles more likely.
17See Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) for more on this number.
18The inefficiency here, stemming from 5.6% of households not working, seems to be small
relative to the potential inefficiencies caused by taxation. Prescott (2004) argues that differences
in marginal tax rates alone potentially explain why Americans work 50 percent more than do their
German, French and Italian counterparts.
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situation where cycles are of concern. The size of σ needed in this section is easily
within the range that can be found in the macro literature. Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-
Salido (2003) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) all use σ = 5. McGrattan,
Rogerson, and Wright (1997) even estimate values of 5.8 and 6.8 (depending on how
they detrend the data).
The reason why cycles are more likely in the search model than in the LS model
is that prices/wages are determined differently in equilibrium. In the search model
wages change when productivity or the tax rate changes, but do not depend on labor
market conditions, such as the number of vacancies or the unemployment rate.19 In
particular, wages remain invariant even when the only (interesting) decision variable
in the labor market, the number of vacancies, varies. In the LS model on the other
hand, wages are not isolated from the only (interesting) decision variable in the labor
market, hours worked. Instead, an increase in hours worked requires an increase in
wages. This difference implies that for a two-period tax cycle - where the tax rate
is decreased in the first period and increased in the second period - ceteris paribus
a larger drop in the tax rate is necessary in the LS model than in the search model
to implement the same increase in output. Since this leads to a larger drop in tax
revenue in the LS economy in the first period, a larger increase in the tax rate in
the second period is necessary to balance the government’s budget. This leads to a
larger drop in output in the second period, making a tax cycle, in terms of welfare,
less attractive in the LS model than in the search model.
The mathematical reason that cycles can improve welfare here lies in the func-
tional form of CS that arises endogenously from the frictions in the model. CS
equals uc(t){ct−{ b2 m(1,vt)/vt−k1
2
m(1,vt)/vt−k}m(1, vt)} here and equals uc(t)ct−χh(t)ht in the LS
economy (using the notation of theorem 2). Whereas −χh(t)ht is a concave function
of ct and ht under the assumptions of theorem 2, −uc(t) b2 m(1,vt)/vt−k1
2
m(1,vt)/vt−km(1, vt) is not
19Hall and Milgrom (2006) argue that a realistic threat in a bargaining game between a firm
and a worker about a joint surplus is to extend bargaining, and not to terminate it and look for
another match. As a consequence, the cost of delay matters for wage determination, not external
labor market conditions.
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a concave function of ct and vt. Therefore the arguments in the proof of theorem
2 do not apply and, as the quantitative exercise above shows, cycles can improve
welfare.
I now use the parameterized model to quantify the welfare effects of implementing
a two-period cycle. Theorem 5, which is also applicable in the search and matching
model, states that the optimal policy implements only two different levels of vacan-
cies, but not necessarily a two-period cycle. Numerically however I was unable to
find a policy that improves upon a two-period cycle. I thus report the welfare gains
from implementing such a cycle, bearing in mind that theoretically it is only a lower
bound.
The computational strategy is straightforward. I simply compute the welfare for
all two-period cycles (for an appropriate grid on the vacancy space). I then choose
the cycle which maximizes welfare, and compare it to the welfare from implement-
ing the TI policy vTI . Finally, I express the welfare gain in terms of consumption
equivalents. As in Lucas (1987), this measure is defined as the percentage compen-
sation required to make a household indifferent between consumption plans with
and without a two-period tax cycle. This number is larger than 0 if a cycle improves
welfare, and equals 0 if not.
Figure 2 shows the results for values of σ between 0 and 10 and different values
of α = 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.65, and 0.7. Each graph (for every α) has a kink at the
level of σ as computed in Table 1. For all values of σ below this level, there is no
welfare gain from a cycle. For higher values of σ, the welfare gains are positive with
a maximum level of 0.7%. This is a sizeable number when compared to the cost of
business cycles as found by Lucas (1987).
The graphs are ordered by α, the elasticity parameter in the matching function,
where a smaller value for α implies larger welfare gains from a cycle. The reason is
that with smaller values of α, employment becomes more responsive to changes in
vacancies (E = m(1, v) = χv1−α). For example, in the extreme case of α = 1, em-
ployment would be constant and policy would be ineffective, whereas employment
would be a linear function of vacancies if α = 0.
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Figure 2: Welfare gains from a two-period cycle in a labor search model
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I now show that for cycles to be welfare-improving, it is not essential that fric-
tions arise in the labor market. I therefore consider a model with frictions in the
product market in the next section, and show that cycles can improve welfare in
this environment as well.
5 Non-Walrasian Product and Credit Markets
In this section I show that a TI policy is not optimal in a parameterized example
of the Lagos and Wright (2005) (LW) model. I choose this model since it provides a
tractable way to deal with two deviations from the LS economy. First, the product
market is not Walrasian. Instead, prices and quantities (of some but not all) goods
are determined through bargaining. Second, credit cannot be used to pay for these
goods, and in its place a liquid asset, which has to be acquired in advance, is re-
quired. Thus in the LW model, both the product market and the credit market have
frictions. Since the model does not restrict the interpretation of what this liquid
asset is, one can think of it as money (as in LW) or as bonds (as in Lagos (2005)).
However, this freedom of interpretation makes a quantitative analysis problematic
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(see below). I now describe the model and then explain how it fits into the “one-
decision” framework of this paper.
Time is discrete and there is a measure one of infinitely-lived agents. Every pe-
riod is divided into two subperiods. In the first subperiod, agents trade in frictionless
markets, followed by a subperiod with trading frictions. I follow the terminology of
LW, referring to the frictionless market as the centralized market (CM), and the
market with frictions as the decentralized market (DM).
The government buys gt = g goods in the CM only and has three ways of paying
for this: a labor tax τt, nominal government bonds Bt, and nominal money creation.
The government’s flow budget constraint is
Mt+1 +Bt+1/Rt+1 = Mt +Bt + Ptgt − Ptτtwtht, (14)
where Mt+1 is nominal money outstanding at the end of period t, Pt is the nominal
price level in the CM, and Rt is the gross nominal return on bonds. The remaining
notation is as in the previous sections.
The household enters the CM in period t with Mt units of money and Bt bonds,
and derives utility Wt(Mt, Bt). It decides how much labor ht to supply, how much
to consume ct and how many bonds Bt+1 to buy. Production in the CM is, as in
LS, a linear function of labor, F (ht) = ht. In addition to these decisions, which are
identical to those taken in the LS economy, every agent can acquire Mt+1 units of
money, which are needed to trade in the subsequent DM. The value of entering the
DM with Mt+1 units of money and Bt+1 bonds is denoted Vt(Mt+1, Bt+1). The CM
problem is
Wt(Mt, Bt) = max
ct,ht,Mt+1,Bt+1
U(ct)− Aht + Vt(Mt+1, Bt+1), (15)
subject to
Ptct +Bt+1/Rt+1 +Mt+1 ≤ Bt +Mt + (1− τt)Ptwtht. (16)
Note that LW assume that utility in the CM is linear in labor. This assump-
tion makes the model analytically tractable since (Mt+1, Bt+1) is independent from
(Mt, Bt). In addition, it simplifies the analysis of the DM, since every agent holds
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the same amount of money.
In the DM, Lagos and Wright (2005) assume that with probability α the house-
hold is a buyer, with probability α the household is a seller, and with probability
1 − 2α the household does not trade. A buyer consumes q in the DM and derives
utility u(q), while a seller produces q at a cost c(q). u is concave, c is convex and
u(0) = c(0) is finite. Then
Vt(Mt+1, Bt+1) = α{u(q(Mt+1)) + βWt+1(Mt+1 − d(Mt+1), Bt+1)} (17)
+ α{−c(q(Mt+1)) + βWt+1(Mt+1 + d(Mt+1), Bt+1)} (18)
+ (1− 2α)βWt+1(Mt+1, Bt+1), (19)
where q(Mt+1) is the quantity produced by the seller and d(Mt+1) is the amount paid
by the buyer to the seller. This payment has to be in terms of money, d(Mt+1) ≤
Mt+1. The terms of trade q and d are determined through Nash bargaining, where
the buyer has bargaining power θ. Instead of repeating the derivation in LW, I simply
restate the results. Let q∗ be defined by u′(q∗) = c′(q∗). Then the solution is
qt(M) =
 qˆt(M) if M < M∗t+1q∗ if M ≥M∗t+1,
dt(M) =
 M if M < M∗t+1M∗t+1 if M ≥M∗t+1,
where qˆt(M) solves βχtM = z(qt), with
z(q) ≡ θc(q)u
′(q) + (1− θ)u(q)c′(q)
θu′(q) + (1− θ)c′(q) , (20)
and where M∗t+1 =
z(q∗)
βχt
and χt =
A
Pt+1wt+1(1−τt+1) . I can now define an equilibrium.
Definition 7. Given initial conditions B0 and M0, an equilibrium is a sequence
{ct, gt = g, ht, qt, dt, τt,Mt+1, Bt+1, Rt+1, wt, Pt}∞t=0, such that:
i) The government budget constraint is satisfied.
ii) The resource constraint in the CM holds: ct + g = ht.
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iii) The household budget constraint (16) is satisfied.
iv) Households choose ct, ht, Bt+1 and Mt+1 in the CM to maximize utility.
v) Firms in the CM maximize profits.
vi) The terms of trade in the DM are determined through Nash bargaining.
vii) The no-Ponzi condition holds: limt→∞ qtBt = 0.
In equilibrium it always holds that Mt+1 < M
∗
t+1. An implementable allocation
can be defined as follows:
Definition 8. For any (B0,M0), an allocation {ct, ht, qt}∞t=0 is imple-
mentable if {τt, wt, dt,Mt+1, Bt+1, Rt+1, Pt}∞t=0 exists, such that {ct, gt =
g, ht, qt, dt, τt,Mt+1, Bt+1, Rt+1, wt, Pt}∞t=0 is an equilibrium.
Using standard techniques (taken from Lucas and Stokey (1983)), Aruoba and
Chugh (2006) derive the implementability constraint for this economy and charac-
terize the set of implementable allocations.
Proposition 4. For any (B0,M0), an allocation {ct, ht, qt}∞t=0 is implementable if
and only if
Uc(c0)
M0 +B0
P0
=
∑
t≥0
βt{Uc(ct)ct − Aht + αz(qt)(u
′(qt)
z′(qt)
− 1)} (21)
ct + g = ht (22)
u′(qt)
z′(qt)
≥ 1. (23)
As is well known (see for example Chari and Kehoe (1999)), it is necessary to
set M0 + B0 = 0 to make the problem interesting (otherwise the Ramsey planner
confiscates the entire initial nominal wealth), and I therefore proceed under this
assumption. Since the nominal interest Rt+1 equals α(
u′(qt)
z′(qt) − 1) + 1, equation (23)
is equivalent to a zero bound on nominal interest rates. For the interpretation of
αz(qt)(
u′(qt)
z′(qt) − 1), note that z(qt) = Mt+1βχt and Uc(ct) = Ptχt−1 (because utility is
quasi-linear in the CM). This implies that z(qt)
Uc(ct)
= Mt+1βχt
Ptχt−1
= Mt+1
Pt
βχt
χt−1
= Mt+1
Pt
1
Rt+1
.
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Thus
αz(qt)(
u′(qt)
z′(qt)
−1)
Uc(ct)
= Mt+1
Pt
Rt+1−1
Rt+1
, the same expression as in Chari and Kehoe
(1999).20 For a more detailed interpretation, see Aruoba and Chugh (2006).
The Ramsey solution then maximizes∑
t≥0
βt{U(ct)− Aht + α(u(qt)− c(qt))} (24)
over all implementable allocations. The resource constraint in the CM again implies
that ct is a simple function of ht, but there is now a second variable, qt. Nevertheless,
the analysis of cycles in the main text can only be applied to the choice of qt. The
same arguments can be used to derive a criterion when the implementation of a time
invariant qTI is not optimal (and h is constant and equals the TI solution hTI). The
criterion for the choice of q is then identical to that in theorem 1 if
CS(qt) = αz(qt)(
u′(qt)
z′(qt)
− 1) and (25)
CU(qt) = α(u(qt)− c(qt)). (26)
I can now evaluate the criterion to assess whether a cycle can improve welfare.
Since an analytical evaluation is unavailable, I am obliged to resort to a numerical
example. I therefore have to choose functional forms for U, u and c and values for
the remaining parameters.
In the CM I set U(c) = log(c), A = 1/2, so that cycles in the CM are ruled out
by theorem 2. In the DM, the utility function equals u(q) = (q+κ)
1−η−κ1−η
1−η + 1, the
cost function c(q) = exp(q2/2), κ = 1 and α = 0.1. This choice of functional forms
would rule out cycles in an LS economy, and cycles would be a rather bad idea since
c is very convex. The assumptions needed in LW for the existence of an equilibrium
(u(0) = c(0) is finite) make it necessary to add a κ to the utility function and to
add 1 to the utility function.
The choice of the functional forms and of α could be guided by two observations
in the data, the demand elasticity of M and the level of velocity, i.e. nominal output
divided by M . Unfortunately this is somewhat problematic, in particular since these
20In this paper Rt+1−1Rt+1 equals the marginal utility of money divided by Uc.
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numbers depend on the interpretation of M in the data. For example, the velocity of
bonds is much lower than the velocity of M1. The elasticity of money also depends
on the time period. For example, the correlation between M1/GDP and a short-
term nominal interest rate is positive for the last 25 years, although it was negative
before then. Instead, I use the parameter values as described above, and report the
results for the velocity and the demand elasticity.
I vary three parameters, η, the curvature parameter of u, θ, the bargaining power
of the buyer and g, government expenditures. For θ = 1, the model with bargaining
is equivalent to a model with competitive price-taking in the DM (see Rocheteau
and Wright (2005)).
Table 2 reports results and further statistics from my parametrization of Lagos
and Wright (2005), such as the size of the CM, the share of government expenditure
and the elasticity of money demand. The velocity of money and the elasticity of
money demand seem to be reasonable (of course, this statement is subject to the
measurement problems discussed above). The size of the government is quite small,
between 13% and 17% of CM output.
The time-invariant q is denoted qTI , and qCy is the constant level of q that
makes the representative household indifferent between consumption plans with and
without a two-period tax cycle. The percentage gain q
Cy
qTI
of a cycle in terms of DM
consumption is quite large. For example, for g = 0.4 and η = 1 (log preferences),
the consumption gain in the DM, q
Cy
qTI
, is close to 50%. The welfare gain can also be
expressed in terms of CM consumption. A household is indifferent between 3.97%
higher consumption in the CM and a two-period cycle.
Figure 3 provides further information on how the welfare gains from a two-
period cycle vary with η. The figure shows q
Cy
qTI
as a function of η for θ = 0.5, 0.75, 1
and g = 0.3, 0.4.
As already observed, a higher value of η unambiguously makes a cycle more likely
to be optimal. Changing the value of the buyer’s bargaining power θ has two main,
potentially opposing, effects on the shape of these curves.
First, θ determines how inefficient qTI is. This affects the criterion (∗) mainly
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Table 2: Results from the parametrization.
g = 0.3, η = 2
θ q
Cy
qTI
qTI g
hTI
DM
Y=DM+CM
mTI
hTI+αmTI
∂m
∂R
R
m
0.5 1.225 0.138 0.135 0.024 0.236 -0.236
0.75 1.096 0.199 0.135 0.024 0.236 -0.253
1 1.007 0.272 0.134 0.023 0.234 -0.246
g = 0.4, η = 2
θ q
Cy
qTI
qTI g
hTI
DM
Y=DM+CM
mTI
hTI+αmTI
∂m
∂R
R
m
0.5 1.406 0.109 0.170 0.022 0.219 -0.125
0.75 1.192 0.165 0.171 0.022 0.221 -0.150
1 1.041 0.235 0.170 0.022 0.221 -0.163
g = 0.4, η = 1
θ q
Cy
qTI
qTI g
hTI
DM
Y=DM+CM
mTI
hTI+αmTI
∂m
∂R
R
m
0.5 1.492 0.131 0.172 0.023 0.226 -0.199
0.75 1.212 0.206 0.173 0.023 0.231 -0.261
1 1.048 0.292 0.172 0.023 0.231 -0.289
Note: qTI , hTI and cTI are the TI levels of q, h and c. qCy is the constant level of q
that makes the representative household indifferent between consumption plans with and
without a two-period tax cycle. DMY=DM+CM is the fraction of output Y produced in the DM,
mTI
hTI+αmTI
is the inverse of money velocity, and ∂m∂R
R
m is the elasticity of money demand.
through changing CU ′. The lower θ is, the smaller the buyer’s share of the surplus
in the DM. This leads to higher prices and less trade in the DM. Table 2 verifies this
claim: q increases in θ, but the amount of money spent does not change substantially
(velocity is almost constant). Whether the Ramsey allocation wants to counteract
this inefficiency through a lower nominal interest rate (and by how much) depends
on the level of g and the standard public finance procedure, i.e. to compare demand
elasticities in the DM and in the CM. For g = 0.3 and θ = 0.5, the efficient level of q
is implemented for small values of η, whereas qTI is always inefficient for θ = 0.75, 1.
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Figure 3: Welfare gains from a two-period cycle in Lagos and Wright (2005)
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As a result, a cycle does not improve welfare when θ = 0.5 and η is low. However,
for higher levels of η, qTI is always lower for a smaller θ (the efficient level of q is
independent from θ). Thus cycles become more likely, and the welfare gains become
larger if θ is smaller.
The second effect of a change in θ is on the curvature of CS, which means it
changes CS ′′ in the criterion (∗). For all parameters, CS ′′ increases in θ, so that
a higher θ makes cycles more likely. Figure 3 then shows the overall effect of θ on
both CS ′′ and CU ′. The other two numbers, CU ′′ and CS ′, turn out to be of minor
importance.
The results so far show that a cycle can improve welfare for all values of η if
g = 0.4 and even if θ = 1 (competitive pricing). The reason that functional forms,
which would imply the optimality of a TI policy in the LS economy, lead to welfare-
improving cycles, even for competitive pricing, is because of credit market frictions.
The credit market frictions which arise endogenously in LW lead to a functional form
for CS, which differs from approaches where money is an argument of the utility
function (Chari and Kehoe (1999)). This has two consequences. First, the Friedman
rule is not necessarily optimal, which implies that qTI is not efficient even if θ = 1.
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This is a necessary condition for a cycle, since efficiency means CU ′ = 0 and the
criterion (∗) cannot be fulfilled. The second implication is that the credit market
friction adds an additional nonlinearity to the function that maps quantities into tax
revenue (CS). In the labor search model and also in LW if θ < 1, bargaining leads
to a nonlinear deviation from the Walrasian mapping of quantities into prices, and
thus mechanically also changes the mapping from quantities into tax revenue. On
top of that, only the medium of exchange is taxed in LW and not trading, which adds
some nonlinearity to the mapping from quantities to tax revenues even if pricing is
competitive (CS ′′ becomes positive).
To analyze how the size of the friction affects the likelihood of an optimal tax
cycle, I consider now the experiment of decreasing α, i.e. the probability that money
is needed in the DM. A decrease in α can be interpreted as an increase in the
probability ρ that credit can be used in a DM meeting. In the benchmark, ρ = 0
and an agent is a buyer, needing money with probability α = 0.1. A value of α = 0.05
then means that with probability 0.1 an agent is a buyer, but needs money only in
50% of these meetings and can pay with credit otherwise. If credit frictions are fully
removed (α = 0), money is not needed and credit can be used in all transactions.
In this limiting case the economy is identical to an LS economy, and a TI policy is
optimal in both the CM and the DM.
Figure 4 shows the result for log preferences in the DM, a bargaining power of
θ = 0.75 and two different levels of government expenditures g = 0.2, 0.4. For both
levels of g Figure 4 shows the percentage welfare gain q
Cy
qTI
and qTI as a function of α.
Somewhat surprisingly, reducing frictions (reducing α) increases q
Cy
qTI
. Furthermore,
for g = 0.2, condition (∗) does not hold for high values of α, although it does hold for
low values of α. The plot of qTI explains both results. As α decreases, inefficiencies
in the DM have smaller welfare effects and thus the Ramsey solution implements a
lower qTI . Given that a cycle improves welfare, a lower qTI (mechanically) increases
qCy
qTI
, since the denominator becomes a small number. A cycle is also more likely to be
welfare-improving as explained above. The less efficient the economy becomes (the
lower qTI), the higher CU ′ is, making it then more likely that condition (∗) holds.
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Figure 4: Welfare gains from a two-period cycle in Lagos and Wright (2005) as a
function of α (credit market friction)
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But inefficiency alone does not imply cycles as I showed in the LS economy (theorem
2 does not depend on the level of g). The second requirement, convexity of CS, is
however unaffected by changes in α. The same convex functional form describes the
government’s tax revenue from the DM.
6 Conclusion
I consider whether tax smoothing or cycles represent the solution to a Ramsey
taxation problem both in a Lucas-Stokey economy and in two models with frictions.
There is no extrinsic uncertainty that would result in cycles.
In an LS economy, a large class of preferences exists where cycles are optimal. I
show that sufficiently strong DRRA implies that cycles are optimal, whereas IRRA
implies that they are not.
I then consider two simple models with frictions: a labor search and matching
economy, following Pissarides (2000); and the Lagos and Wright (2005) economy, a
model with frictions in the goods and credit market. A cycle is now optimal for a
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class of preferences that was considered to imply the opposite in the Lucas-Stokey
world. Thus the results established for the Lucas-Stokey economy, which guaranteed
optimal tax smoothing for a certain class of preferences, do not prove to carry over
to all models of interest.
My results suggest the possibility that cycles could improve welfare. This is
especially true in models with frictions, which invalidate the first welfare theorem
and lead to noncompetitive pricing.21 For specific applications, the theorems in this
paper are helpful along two dimensions. First, they can imply that cycles are never
welfare-improving, so that one can proceed with a first-order approach. Second,
they provide a condition to check whether a cycle can improve welfare. Although
this condition has to be checked in every application, it provides some guidance to
the features that potentially lead to cycles: inefficient allocations, and non linear
pricing that leads to a convex tax revenue function.
Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
In principle, four cases have to be considered. Labor supply can be too high (CU ′ <
0) or too low (CU ′ > 0), and tax revenue can be increasing (CS ′ > 0) or decreasing
(CS ′ < 0) in h. Two cases can be ruled out immediately if we allow for transfers
from the government to the household (this means the implementability constraint
becomes an inequality constraint; in any case I use this “trick” later.). If CU ′ > 0 and
CS ′ > 0, an increase in labor supply is welfare-improving and raises tax revenues.
Conversely, if CU ′ < 0 and CS ′ < 0, a decrease in labor supply is welfare-improving
and raises tax revenues. Two cases remain. In Case I, the labor supply is too low
(CU ′ > 0) and cutting taxes decreases tax revenue (CS ′ < 0). In Case II, labor
supply is too high (CU ′ < 0) and the economy is on the downside of the Laffer
curve, so that lowering taxes increases tax revenue (CS ′ > 0). In Case I (∗) is
21Adding capital to these models (and allowing for capital income taxation) would change the
quantitative results but not the main conclusions of the paper.
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equivalent to
CS ′′
CS ′
(hTI)− CU
′′
CU ′
(hTI) < 0 (∗I)
and in Case II (∗) is equivalent to
CS ′′
CS ′
(hTI)− CU
′′
CU ′
(hTI) > 0 (∗II)
I use a perturbation argument to show that a TI policy is not optimal. Consider two
consecutive periods (t and t+1) where the same amount of labor hTI is implemented.
In the first period, labor supply is increased by ∆ ≥ 0. In the second period, labor
supply is decreased by δ/β ≥ 0. Let S(∆, δ) be the present value surplus and V (∆, δ)
the present value utility from these two periods (evaluated at hTI). Thus
S(∆, δ) = CS(hTI + ∆) + β · CS(hTI − δ/β)
V (∆, δ) = CU(hTI + ∆) + β · CU(hTI − δ/β)
For small ∆, define δS(∆) and δV (∆) such that
S(∆, δS(∆)) = 0
V (∆, δV (∆)) = 0
If multiple solutions exist, the smallest δ is chosen. Define δ∗(∆) = (δS(∆) +
δV (∆))/2.
If condition (∗) holds, it will be shown that for small ∆, a joint increase by ∆ in the
first period and a decrease by δ(∆)/β in the second period increase both S and V .
An increase in S means that this policy change is implementable by proposition 14,
while an increase in V means that this policy change is welfare-improving.
Thus let S˜ and B˜ be defined as follows:
S˜(∆) = S(∆, δ∗(∆))
V˜ (∆) = V (∆, δ∗(∆))
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Obviously δ∗(0) = (δS(0) + δV (0))/2 = 0. Implicit differentiation results in:
∂δ∗(·)
∂∆
(0) =
∂δS(·)
∂∆
(0) =
∂δV (·)
∂∆
(0) = 1
∂2δS(·)
∂∆∂∆
(0) =
(1 + β) · CS ′′(hTI)
β · CS ′(hTI)
∂2δV (·)
∂∆∂∆
(0) =
(1 + β) · CU ′′(hTI)
β · CU ′(hTI) .
Consider first derivatives with respect to ∆:
∂S˜
∂∆
= CS ′(hTI + ∆)− CS ′(hTI − δ∗(∆)/β) · δ∗′(∆)
∆=0
= 0
∂V˜
∂∆
= CU ′(hTI + ∆)− CU ′(hTI − δ∗(∆)/β) · δ∗′(∆)
∆=0
= 0.
This shows that a linear approximation does not produce an affirmative answer.
Therefore the sign of the second derivatives is decisive:
∂2S˜
∂∆∂∆
= CS ′′(hTI + ∆) + CS ′′(hTI − δ∗(∆)/β)/β · (δ∗′(∆))2 − CS ′(hTI − δ∗(∆)/β) · δ∗′′(∆)
∆=0
= CS ′′(hTI)(1 + β)/β − CS ′(hTI) · δ∗′′(0)
= (1 + β)/β · {CS ′′(hTI)− CS ′(hTI)/2 · [CS
′′(hTI)
CS ′(hTI)
+
CU ′′(hTI)
CU ′(hTI)
]}
> (1 + β)/β · {CS ′′(hTI)− CS ′(hTI)/2 · [2 · CS
′′(hTI)
CS ′(hTI)
]}
= 0,
where the inequality sign follows in case I from (∗I) and CS ′(hTI) < 0, and in case
II from (∗II) and CS ′(hTI) > 0. The same calculations for V result in:
∂2V˜
∂∆∂∆
∆=0
= CU ′′(hTI)(1 + β)/β − CU ′(hTI) · δ∗′′(0)
= (1 + β)/β · {CU ′′(hTI)− CU ′(hTI)/2 · [CS
′′(hTI)
CS ′(hTI)
+
CU ′′(hTI)
CU ′(hTI)
]}
> (1 + β)/β · {CU ′′(hTI)− CU ′(hTI)/2 · [2 · CU
′′(hTI)
CU ′(hTI)
]}
= 0,
where the inequality sign again follows in case I from (∗I) and CU ′(hTI) > 0, and
in case II from (∗II) and CU ′(hTI) < 0.
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Proof of Theorem 2
The Ramsey problem is to choose ct and ht to maximize utility subject to imple-
mentability and resource constraints. In a first step it is shown that both these
constraints can be written as inequalities, such that the (relaxed) Ramsey problem
reads as follows:
Maxct,ht
∞∑
t=0
βt(w(ct)− χ(ht))
s.t.
∑
t≥0
βt(wc(ct) · ct − χh(ht) · ht) ≥ 0
ct + g ≤ ht.
Suppose first that in the (relaxed) maximization problem, the resource constraint
is fulfilled with strict inequality for some t. Then decreasing ht improves welfare
and still satisfies the relaxed implementability constraint (the implementability con-
straint is decreasing in ht).
Thus the resource constraint is fulfilled with equality for all t, and ct = ht − g.
Suppose now that the implementability constraint is fulfilled with strict inequality.
Then for some t:
(wc(ct) · ct − χh(ht) · ht) > 0.
Since ct + g = ht,:
0 < (wc(ct) · ct − χh(ht) · ht)
= wc(ct) · (ht · (1− χh(ht)/wc(ct))− g)
⇒ (1− χh(ht)/wc(ct)) > 0
⇔ wc(ct) > χh(ht).
Thus increasing ht and ct by the same (small) amount improves welfare. The relaxed
implementability constraint is still fulfilled, since it was assumed to hold with strict
inequality.
These arguments imply that the solution to the relaxed problem fulfills both con-
straints with equality. Therefore the solution to the relaxed problem and the solution
to the Ramsey problem coincide.
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A substitution of variables vt := w(ct) results in an equivalent maximization problem
(P ∗) which reads as follows:
Maxvt,ht
∞∑
t=0
βt(vt − χ(ht))
s.t.
∑
t≥0
βt(ϕ(ψ(vt))− χh(ht) · ht) ≥ 0
ψ(vt) + g ≤ ht
for all feasible vt (those where a ct exists such that vt = u(ct), ψ(v) = w
−1(v) and
ϕ(c) = wc(c) · c.
It will be shown that this problem is convex for IRRA utility functions. This amounts
to showing that both constraints are convex.
This is true for the resource constraint, since the inverse of any increasing concave
utility function is convex.
For the implementability constraint, κ(v) := ϕ(ψ(vt)) has to be a concave function
(concave since the inequality sign is ≥ and not ≤.). χh(ht) · ht is a convex function
by assumption, so that
κ′′(v) = ϕ′′(ψ′)2 + ϕ′ψ′′
=
2w′′ + w′′′ · c
(w′)2
− (w
′ + w′′c)w′′
(w′)3
=
w′′
(w′)2
(1 +
w′′′c
w′′
− w
′′c
w′
) ≤ 0
since w is increasing and concave and IRRA is equivalent to
1 +
w′′′c
w′′
− w
′′c
w′
≥ 0.
Since problem (P ∗) is strictly concave, first-order conditions for every t have a unique
solution (v∗t , h
∗
t ). Since first-order conditions are necessary for an optimum, (v
∗
t , h
∗
t )
is the optimal choice at t. Furthermore, since the maximization problem is identical
for all t, the same (v∗, h∗) is implemented in every period t. As problem (P ∗) is
equivalent to the Ramsey problem, (c∗ := w−1(v∗), h∗) is the optimal choice in every
period.
Proof of Theorem 3
This follows from theorem 4.
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Proof of Theorem 4
I check condition (*) of theorem 2. The functional form of the utility function implies
that
CU ′ = w′ − χ′
CU ′′ = w′′ − χ′′
CS ′ = w′ + w′′c− χ′ − χ′′h
CS ′′ = 2w′′ + w′′′c− 2χ′′ − χ′′′h
χ′
w′
= 1− τTI
and therefore
CS ′
CU ′
= 1 +
w′′c− χ′′h
w′ − χ′ = 1 +
w′′c
w′ − χ′ −
χ′′h
w′ − χ′
= 1 +
w′′c
w′τTI
− χ
′′h
χ′ τ
TI
1−τTI
= 1 + ηc
1
τTI
− ηh1− τ
TI
τTI
CS ′′
CU ′′
= 2 +
w′′′c− χ′′′h
w′′ − χ′′ = 2 +
w′′′c
w′′ − χ′′ −
χ′′′h
w′′ − χ′′
= 2 +
w′′′c
w′′
1
1− χ′′
w′′
− χ
′′′h
χ′′
1
w′′
χ′′ − 1
.
Since
χ′′
w′′
= ηh
χ′
w′′h
= ηh
w′(1− τTI)2
w′′c
=
ηh(1− τTI)2
ηc
it follows that the optimality criterion
CS ′′
CU ′′
− CS
′
CU ′
= 1 + κc
1
1− ηh(1−τTI)2
ηc
− κh 1ηc
(1−τTI)2ηh − 1
− ηc 1
τTI
+ ηh
1− τTI
τTI
= 1 +
κcηc − κhηh(1− τTI)2
ηc − ηh(1− τTI)2 +
ηh(1− τTI)− ηc
τTI
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
The assumption that κh ≥ −2 implies that
CS ′
CU ′
= 1 + ηc
1
τTI
− ηh1− τ
TI
τTI
≤ 1 + ηc 1
τTI
CS ′′
CU ′′
=
2w′′ + w′′′c
w′′ − χ′′ −
2χ′′ + χ′′′h
w′′ − χ′′ =
w′′
w′′ − χ′′ (2 + κc)−
χ′′
w′′ − χ′′ (2 + κh) ≥
w′′
w′′ − χ′′ (2 + κc).
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If 2 + κc ≥ 0, then CS′′CU ′′ ≥ 0. Since CS
′
CU ′ ≤ 0 at the optimal TI policy (see the
arguments in the proof of theorem 1), condition (∗ ∗ ∗) is not satisfied.
If 2 + κc ≤ 0, then ηc < 0 and
CS ′′
CU ′′
− CS
′
CU ′
≥ w
′′
w′′ − χ′′ (2 + κc)− (1 +
ηc
τTI
) ≥ (2 + κc)− (1 + ηc
τTI
).
Both claims follow since (2+κc)−(1+ ηcτTI ) ≥ (2+κc)−(1+ηc), which is positive
for IRRA preferences.
Proof of Theorem 5
For a fixed set of labor supply levels {h1, . . . hn}, consider the following convexified
problem:
max
pi=(pi1,...,pin)
n∑
i=1
piiv(hi) (27)
subject to
n∑
i=1
piiγ(hi) = 0 (28)
n∑
i=1
pii = 1 (29)
0 ≤ pii ≤ 1, (30)
where v(ht) = u(ht − g, ht) and γ(ht) = uc(ht − g, ht) · (ht − g) + uh(ht − g, ht) · ht.
A pi is called admissible if it fulfills (28)-(30). It is a standard result in linear program-
ming (see e.g. Dantzig (1963)) that a corner (or vertex or extreme point) solution is
optimal, where a corner is defined as follows:
Definition 9. An admissible pi = {pi1, . . . , pin} is a corner (or vertex or extreme
point) if for all admissible p˜i = {p˜i1, . . . , p˜in} and pˆi = {pˆi1, . . . , pˆin} and λ ∈ (0, 1):
pi = λp˜i + (1− λ)pˆi ⇒ pi = p˜i = pˆi. (31)
I show next that for a corner pi, at most two pii are not zero. Suppose there is a
corner with a support larger than two. Thus there exist three different i (i1, i2, i3)
such that pii1 , pii2 , pii3 6= 0. I now define p˜i 6= pi and pˆi 6= pi such that 12 p˜i+ 12 pˆi = pi, i.e.
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pi is not a corner. Note that without loss of generality all γj := γ(hij) (j ∈ {1, 2, 3})
take different values, since for the same γ value, only the h that gives the highest
utility is chosen. Define
p˜ii1 := pi1 − 
γ2 − γ3
γ1 − γ3 (32)
p˜ii2 := pi2 +  (33)
p˜ii3 := pi3 − 
γ1 − γ2
γ1 − γ3 (34)
pˆii1 := pi1 + 
γ2 − γ3
γ1 − γ3 (35)
pˆii2 := pi2 −  (36)
pˆii3 := pi3 + 
γ1 − γ2
γ1 − γ3 (37)
for some sufficiently small  > 0. For all other indices, p˜i, pˆi and pi coincide.
Since p˜i and pˆi are admissible and fulfill 1
2
p˜i + 1
2
pˆi = pi, pi is not a corner.
Thus the solution of the convexified problem has the desired property of a support
not larger than two.
I now show that this is also the case for the Ramsey problem. Suppose the Ramsey
problem implements labor supply levels h1, . . . hn, where hi is implemented at dates
Ii := {t | ht = hi}. Define pi as follows:
pii := (1− β)
∑
t∈Ii
βt (38)
Since the Ramsey solution fulfills the implementability constraint, pi is admissible.
The above arguments show that an admissible p˜i exists with a support not larger
than two, which produces the same welfare level. This implies that
(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βtv(ht) =
n∑
i=1
piiv(h
i) ≤ p˜i1v(hi1) + p˜i2v(hi2) (39)
for some 1 ≤ i1, i2 ≤ n.
I now show that J1, J2 ⊂ N0 exist, such that J1 ∪ J2 = N0 and
(1− β)
∑
s∈J1
βs = p˜i1 and (40)
(1− β)
∑
s∈J2
βs = p˜i2 (41)
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The following algorithm achieves this. Define a sequence of index sets J1(t), J2(t) as
follows: J1(−1) = J2(−1) = ∅.
J1(t) = J1(t− 1) ∪ {t}, J2(t) = J2(t− 1), if p˜i1 − pˆi1(t− 1) ≥ p˜i2 − pˆi1(t− 1)
J1(t) = J1(t− 1), J2(t) = J2(t− 1) ∪ {t}, otherwise,
where pˆii(t) := (1− β)
∑
s∈Ji(t) β
s and pˆii(−1) = 0.
J1 := limt→∞ J1(t) and J2 := limt→∞ J2(t).
This algorithm works if p˜ii ≥ pˆii(t) holds for all t ≥ 0. This is true for t if it is true
for t− 1 and if
(1− β)βt ≤ max{p˜i1 − pˆi1(t− 1), p˜i2 − pˆi2(t− 1)}. (42)
Since p˜i1 + p˜i2 = 1, pˆi1(t− 1) + pˆi2(t− 1) = (1− β)
∑t−1
s=0 β
s = 1− βt and β > 1/2
p˜i1 + p˜i2 − pˆi1(t− 1)− pˆi2(t− 1) = βt > 2(1− β)βt. (43)
The algorithm converges because (43) implies (42) and pˆii(t) → p˜ii. Thus the same
welfare level can be reached with two different tax levels:
(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βtv(ht) =
n∑
i=1
piiv(h
i) (44)
≤ p˜i1v(hi1) + p˜i2v(hi2) = (1− β)(
∑
s∈J1
βsv(hi1) +
∑
s∈J2
βsv(hi2))
An infinite support can be ruled out as follows. Consider the problem truncated at
time n. The support of these problems is not larger than two. Since the welfare of
the solution for n = ∞ is the limit for n → ∞, the optimal solution can always be
approximated by a solution with a finite support (of size two).
Proof of Proposition 3
The household’s present value budget constraint reads as follows:
B0 =
∑
t≥0
qt · {ct − It · Et} (45)
From the free-entry condition k = m(1,vt)
vt
1
2
(1− b
1−τt ), it follows that
(1− τt) =
b
2
m(1, vt)/vt
1
2
m(1, vt)/vt − k . (46)
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Income then equals
It =
1
2
(1− τt) + 1
2
b (47)
=
1
2
b
2
m(1, vt)/vt
1
2
m(1, vt)/vt − k +
1
2
b (48)
=
b
2
{1 +
1
2
m(1, vt)/vt
1
2
m(1, vt)/vt − k} (49)
=
b
2
{ m(1, vt)/vt − k1
2
m(1, vt)/vt − k}. (50)
The proposition follows since the consumption Euler equation implies that
qt = β
t · uc(t)
uc(0)
and Et = m(1, vt).
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